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This article investigates local experiences of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
for Sierra Leone and explains how these experiences were influenced by the parallel 
administration of many peacebuilding processes. Using qualitative data it shows how 
the goals and procedures of these various processes overlapped and interacted in the 
imaginations of local people, generated unpredicted expectations, and eventually led to 
negative experiences of the commission’s work. I describe how Tsing’s idea of ‘friction’ 
can helpfully explain local experiences of peacebuilding and the new concept of 
‘compound friction’ is introduced as a tool for understanding the local impacts of parallel 
peacebuilding processes. 
_____________________________ 
 
A great amount of recent peacebuilding literature examines the relationship between 
theory, practice, and experiences of peacebuilding interventions.  Much of this literature 
argues that many peacebuilding practices are disconnected from local postwar needs 
and indigenous approaches.0F1 For example, peacebuilding approaches that center on 
liberal economic and democratic principles – what has come to be known as the ‘liberal 
peace’ – have been widely criticized.1F2 This is true also of peacebuilding approaches that 
attempt to provide transitional justice and intergroup reconciliation, including truth 
commissions.2F3 In many ways established theory and the currently popular approaches 
to peacebuilding have been under a sustained assault as detractors have claimed that 
they are overly top-down, elite centered, and externally driven. This paper aims not to 
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add to this critical literature, but to provide a potential explanation for some of the 
negative local experiences reported regarding peacebuilding interventions and to, at the 
minimum, provide a new perspective on the problem.   
Using qualitative data regarding local experiences of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) collected during ten months of fieldwork in northern Sierra Leone, 
this paper describes the manner in which local people experience parallel peacebuilding 
processes – interventions applied simultaneously within the postwar setting – as 
interrelated, interacting, and sometimes confused. In the situation examined here local 
people re-imagined the goals and processes of the TRC in interaction with those of the 
various parallel peacebuilding processes, imagining connections and relationships 
between them and eventually undermining the coherence of the TRC in ways 
unpredicted by the international planners and administrators. What the data 
demonstrates is that international peacebuilding, and particularly complex peacebuilding 
efforts characterized by the parallel administration of multiple processes, is inherently 
generative of unexpected and potentially disruptive experiences among local people.  
In response, I turn to the concept of ‘friction’ put forth by Anna Lowenhaupt 
Tsing.3F4 While Rosalind Shaw has already exhibited how this concept can assist 
peacebuilding scholars and practitioners in understanding interactions between the 
international and local in Sierra Leone,4F5 I show how the concept can be expanded to 
understand ‘compound frictions’ wherein a diversity of international peacebuilding 
interventions – each embodying different and even competing “universal” norms and 
paradigms – interact with one another in the minds and imaginations of local audiences 
to produce unpredictable expectations and experiences. While Tsing’s friction 
recognizes the interaction between international and local to be active and 
unpredictable, I argue there that ‘compound friction’ allows us to focus attention on the 
dynamic interaction on the ground between multiple parallel interventions within and 
among local actors.  This paper, therefore, illustrates how the administration of parallel 
peacebuilding processes by the international community adds additional complexity to 
already “awkward engagements.”5F6  
The rest of this paper is divided into five parts. The first part briefly describes the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, the practices of the TRC, the goals it hoped to attain, and the 
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research methodology I used to investigate the local experiences of the process in 
Makeni, a town in the rural north of the country. Part two presents my data and 
describes the problems encountered by the TRC. This section focuses specifically on 
how local people conflated in their own minds the processes of the various 
peacebuilding projects and how this affected local expectations and experiences of the 
TRC.  Part three returns to Tsing’s notion of friction and describes the generative nature 
of interaction between international universals and local particulars, while part four  
proceeds to expand this theory and describe the concept of ‘compound friction,’ or the 
interaction between international interventions competing in their travels to transport 
among local settings different “universal” paradigms and ideas. The conclusion argues 
that peacebuilding, as both a practical and scholarly endeavor, must begin to recognize 
the true implications of complex peacebuilding projects in postwar settings and makes a 
number of simple recommendations towards this end.  
 
War, Truth Telling, and Evaluation of Experience in Sierra Leone 
 
For 11 years between the spring of 1991 and early 2002 Sierra Leone was the site of 
one of the most violent and confused conflicts in recent history. The war started with a 
small incursion from neighboring Liberia. However, as this small group, labeling itself 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), attracted dissatisfied and disaffected portions of 
the population of Sierra Leone its numbers and strength quickly grew. Within just one 
year the RUF managed to accomplish its stated primary objective, the overthrow of the 
All People’s Congress (APC) government, which had at that point been in power for 
some 24 years. However, instead of putting down their arms and joining the government 
in power, the new government and the RUF continued to fight, the conflict spiraled out 
of control, and violence became a common occurrence throughout the country for the 
next ten years.  
Over this period a number of different armed groups committed various atrocities 
throughout the country. Children were regularly recruited and indoctrinated into many of 
them,6F7 women and girls were captured and taken as ‘bush wives’ and often subjected to 
rape and forced labor,7F8 and the amputation of hands, feet, arms and legs became a 
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common event.8F9 The war degraded into a series of failed peace accords and coups, 
with the RUF at one point joining with former Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) troops to form 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This unfortunate period brought some 
of the worst atrocities of the war to Freetown itself, with one particularly violent period 
being aptly named ‘operation no living thing’.9F10 
It was for the purposes of responding to such atrocities that the international 
community established the TRC at the end of the war with the primary purpose of 
discovering truth in order to catalyze reconciliation; to provide psychological healing, 
catharsis and restorative justice. The TRC attempted to do this through public education 
and mass media based sensitization, statement taking, public hearings, and the 
creation of a database of wartime violence.10F11 However, following the South African 
model, the linchpin of its interaction with the general Sierra Leonean public were the 
public hearings.11F12 Conducted in the headquarter towns of each of the countries rural 
districts as well as in Freetown, these hearings were public performances of victim, 
witness, and perpetrator stories, in front of audiences of local people, key stakeholders, 
and the media in town halls and community centers throughout the country. This 
particular process is one example of what has become a primary vehicle of intergroup 
reconciliation in postwar settings over the past thirty years.  
TRCs are often considered to be a compromise form of justice, situated 
somewhere between the close examination of evidence foundational to retributive 
justice and the failure or refusal to examine the past which characterizes impunity.12F13 
They allow the identification of the guilty and the innocent, the victim and the 
perpetrator, without the new pain of punishment, and this is theorized to create 
restorative justice and healing. Although the initial bodies that were later be defined as 
truth commissions generally only collected witness, victim, and perpetrator stories for 
the purpose of report writing – to form an official history of violations during war or 
authoritarian rule – in the wake of the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa, an alternative 
path was chosen. In this new model stories became public testimonies thought to 
catalyze national healing, intergroup forgiveness, and reconciliation. In this way the 
public hearings process, the performance of truth telling in front of live audiences in 
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towns throughout the country, was itself theorized to create what Nadler and Schnabel 
have called ‘socioemotional’ reconciliation.13F14   
This South African approach became a touchstone and model for all future 
commissions,14F15 including the Sierra Leonean TRC, which adopted the idea of public 
hearings and itself claimed that such public performances of truth telling would ‘cater to 
the needs of the victims’ and promote ‘social harmony and reconciliation’.15F16 These 
public hearings were not necessary for collecting information regarding the conflict. The 
stories presented had already been recorded by the TRC staff during the statement 
taking phase of the commission’s work. Instead, the hearings can only be understood 
as an attempt to initiate psychological healing and reconciliation through a cycle of 
apology, acknowledgement, forgiveness and assurance, as described by various 
conflict resolution theorists.16F17 However, anthropological work studying the effects of 
these hearings among local audiences described the TRC not as cathartic, but as 
disconnected and culturally inappropriate.17F18  
It was to explore the inconsistencies between transitional justice theory and 
these more locally grounded evaluations that I spent ten months in northern Sierra 
Leone conducting an ethnographic evaluation of the local understandings, perceptions, 
and experiences of the TRC’s work in Makeni – a semi-rural town in northern Sierra 
Leone – from August 2008 to July 2009. I spent the first three months of my time in 
Makeni volunteering with a local non-government organization (NGO) focusing on child 
health issues, learning Krio, and getting acquainted with the town. Throughout this time 
I also volunteered with a number of different organizations to become knowledgeable 
regarding the local situation from different perspectives. After three months I hired a 
research assistant and translator and conducted 62 semi-structured interviews among 
various groups. Thirty interviews were conducted among local people who had attended 
the TRC’s public hearings and were sampled through snowball sampling, 12 interviews 
were conducted with local elites such as business leaders, the Paramount Chief, the 
District Chief Imam, the Mayor, the Bishop, etc., and 20 interviews were conducted with 
town residents, sampled randomly from a database of all addresses in Makeni and 
interviewing the first willing adult at each house. 
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 In these interviews I tried to determine what local people had understood about 
the TRC process, how they had been sensitized to it and how much they had been 
engaged by the project. I tried to determine how they had experienced the process of 
the hearings, if it had been a good thing or a bad thing, and how their family, friends, 
and community had reacted to the hearings process. For those who had not attended, I 
tried to determine why they had chosen not to and if they felt they had missed an 
opportunity by not attending. Throughout, I avoided using terms such as reconciliation, 
healing, or justice, instead asking if the TRC had done what people expected or needed 
it to do, or if it had helped them to recover from the war. From these interviews a 
detailed picture of local experiences of the TRC emerged, but it was not what scholars 
of transitional justice or reconciliation predict. 
 
Local Expectations, Experiences, and Parallel Peacebuilding Processes  
 
If you talk only to the local educated English speaking elites in Makeni, or as one local 
man described them, those who ‘hold the town,’ you might come to believe that both the 
goals and processes of the TRC were clearly communicated to the local audience. As 
the Mayor said to me, the TRC went ‘to every last village.’ But, confirming findings from 
earlier studies,18F19 the situation proved not so simple. Over the course of my interviews 
around Makeni I found that the supposed sensitization messages of the TRC, what it 
intended to do and how it intended to do it, was unevenly understood and that many 
non-elites either did not or could not distinguish the processes and procedures of the 
TRC from the work of other organizations active in the postwar setting. This was 
particularly true of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the demobilization, 
disarmament, and rehabilitation (DDR) program for former combatants.19F20 As the 
processes of the TRC were conflated with those of other peacebuilding interventions 
many of my interviewees had misconceptions which raised expectations about what it 
would or could do for them. As a result, local’s overall experience of the process were 
heavily affected by the operation of these parallel peacebuilding processes. 
In Sierra Leone there was a large radio campaign that was supposed to inform 
the population about the goals and processes of the TRC. Indeed, almost everyone with 
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whom I talked said that they had heard programs on the radio that mentioned the TRC, 
and from this radio campaign some sensitization was achieved. The general idea of 
reconciliation between people seems to have been understood and even appreciated. 
Brima, a 25 year old farmer, told me that they had ‘brought the TRC because we were 
having war in our country, so that they will bring those that were in the bush and we the 
civilians to talk to us, so that we have peace with them.’ Lansana, 30 years old, said that 
the ‘the reason why they decided to come with the TRC is to make people forgive and 
forget.’ Similarly Yamboi, a 30 year old salesman, said that ‘the TRC means peace … 
during that time they were trying to bring people together, they were trying to explain the 
message for all that has happened. Let us forgive and forget.’ 
 Each of these quotes describes, broadly, the actual mission of the TRC, and in 
this way we can see the partial success of the radio sensitization campaign. However, 
providing this quite cursory understanding of the goals of the TRC – peace, bringing 
people together, forgiving and forgetting – does not really provide any understanding of 
the process of the TRC, and it was the process that was confused with various other 
peacebuilding interventions. Yeabu was a 30 year old food seller, a woman who had left 
Makeni when she was younger but had returned during the war. When Yeabu was 
asked what she had heard as the key message of the TRC’s radio sensitization 
campaign she responded: 
What they were saying is that, they said they had cut the hands of people and 
now they are not having any help, others have died, others are not able to help 
their children to go to school and not giving them half help. The people are 
suffering. 
This she interpreted as the key message of the TRC’s radio programs. Not anything 
about how the TRC would work or what it would do. The radio messages were 
supposed to explain what locals should expect from the TRC, but these important points 
were not well communicated and the result, among many, was a great amount of 
confusion between the TRC and the various other post-war processes that were 
administered after the war. For example, as was reported also by Schabas and by 
Shaw, 20F21 many non-elite locals confused the operations of the TRC with those of the 
SCSL. 
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Kumba, a 37 year old woman working as a trader, who had attended the TRC, 
had seen her cousin shot during the war in Lunsar, where, she told us, the rebels had 
also burned her Aunt’s house. When asked what she had heard about the TRC on the 
radio she responded that the TRC had come ‘to judge those that were involved in the 
war.’ Similarly, Adama, a 29 year old woman also working as a trader, said that ‘when 
they called on those that did bad things … they took them to court.’ Even Abdul, a 
young police officer, argued that the TRC was ‘to try those, that those that committed 
the greatest responsibility, for them to be brought to book, so that they can answer 
exactly.’ This role, the trial of those bearing the ‘greatest responsibility,’ was the 
mandate of the SCSL, not the TRC. In this way, the messages non-elite locals 
understood from the sensitization campaign were confused and conflated with the 
messages being communicated regarding the SCSL, which operated parallel to the 
TRC. 
Schabas considers this a potential success of the TRC’s sensitization campaign, 
in that it proves, he says, that locals had knowledge of the existence of both bodies.21F22 
But I would argue the opposite. I would say it shows that local non-elites confused the 
two processes. Horovitz suggests that when Truth Commissions and courts function 
side by side ‘advance planning should include a comprehensive sensitization program 
prior to the creation of the mechanisms to educate the public on their respective 
roles’.22F23 In an ideal world, this is how it would work. However, such confidence in 
sensitization campaigns in desperately poor countries among largely illiterate 
populations is naïve. When these two parallel peacebuilding processes interacted with 
the local communities they produced not clear impressions of their respective 
mandates, goals and procedures, but misunderstanding and a conflation of purposes. 
The two streams of information were intertwined and re-imagined by local people; 
absorbed into an unpredicted conception of both the TRC and the SCSL; one that the 
planners of both had failed to expect and which produced among local people 
unpredictable expectations. However, it was not only these two transitional justice 
institutions that were confused among the population. 
 Other local people confused the work carried out by the TRC with that of 
international NGOs; confusing what was provided to them by Care, Plan, UNICEF, 
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Doctors without Borders, or other NGOs, with what was done by the TRC. Kondeh, a 
young man I met at Panlap amputee village, was a good example of this. Kondeh had 
been stabbed in the stomach during the war and now had yards of plastic tubing in 
place of parts of his intestines. He had to eat a very particular amount of food each day 
to avoid a debilitating pain resulting from a blockage or a collapse of his plastic insides. 
Only 19 at the time of the interview in late 2008 (12 or 13 at the end of the war), Kondeh 
saw no difference between the organization that provided him with medical services and 
food and the TRC. As he said when asked if the TRC had accomplished its goals: 
Well for me at least, TRC, they tried. For me they did well. Because if I am living 
now it was for them as my condition was not good. I went on surgery for about 
four times, at the government hospital in Freetown, I went there three times. After 
that a doctor was brought from overseas and was able to do it successfully, 
because everybody thought I would die. 
It is quite clear that the TRC did not provide Kondeh, or anyone else, with medical care, 
but throughout our interview he conflated the work of some international relief agency or 
NGO with that of the TRC.  
Amadu, a local area chief on the south side of Makeni, was also unsure about 
what work was completed by the TRC and what was the work of NGOs. When we 
asked him what things the TRC had done to help create peace, Amadu said that they 
‘saw a lot were built for, we just don’t know if it was the TRC that did that.’ Hawa said 
she did remember the TRC, and she had appreciated its work. However, when asked to 
describe what they had done she described the work of a local NGO that conducted 
family mediation. According to Hawa, the best work that the TRC did was ‘what they 
have done for this, my sister and her husband. I have learnt that they have done 
something for me that I will never forget. Their marriage was almost coming to an end.’ 
Hawa thought the TRC had conducted domestic mediation processes and helped her 
sister resolve her marital problems.  
These are simple examples of the great amount of misunderstanding among 
non-elites between what other postwar processes did and what the TRC accomplished. 
The radio sensitization campaign appears to have been rather successful at informing 
people that the TRC was coming, or that it would assist in bringing peace. However, it 
Published in International Peacekeeping, 2013, 20(2), pp 189-203. 
was not at all successful in communicating to people the position of the TRC relative to 
other post-war actors or the specific processes it would carry out, as distinct from these 
other projects. In turn, because many people were confused about what the TRC would 
do they reconfigured the many messages they were hearing to create their own 
interpretations; leading to unfounded expectations. Those who confused the TRC with 
the SCSL believed it would put people in jail while those who confused it with NGOs felt 
it should build houses or provide medical care.  
 Similarly, and perhaps most problematically, a number of people interpreted the 
functions of the TRC through a perspective clouded or colored by the experience of the 
DDR program. These local people believed that the TRC would or should provide 
‘packages’, as had been received by the ex-combatants who participated in DDR. This 
was most poignantly voiced my Momadu, a 72 year old amputee at Panlap amputee 
camp who stated that: 
The TRC, what they put in front was they were to give the former combatants 
packages, and they said after that they are going to consider us, the victims. Our 
consideration is still to come forth, since we don’t hold guns and our business 
looks to be delayed. Most of our brothers have died. So but now some of us that 
are still living we don’t know if we will have the opportunity for that because even 
me sitting here I am not well. 
Similarly, Michael, the leader of one of two Polio victims groups in Makeni, felt 
that the TRC was a ‘provocation,’ because there was ‘no packet for people that 
suffered’ and nothing for those who told their stories.  I learned, over my time in Makeni, 
that the word ‘packet’ is indicative of an implicit comparison between the TRC’s benefits 
vis-à-vis victims, and the DDR program’s benefits vis-à-vis perpetrators. In the 
comparison, and sometimes confusion, between the two processes, the manner in 
which they became interrelated in the re-imagined conceptions of local non-elites, the 
DDR program had itself set expectations for the TRC. In turn, that reconfiguration, with 
all of the associated expectations, greatly impacted the evaluation of the TRC among 
local non-elites.  
Even local elites – who had a much better idea of the TRC’s process and a more 
positive evaluation of the TRC overall23F24 – were quite vocal in their condemnation of the 
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TRC for not following through on this expectation among the non-elites and the direct 
victims of the violence. They voiced anger at the TRC for raising the expectations of 
non-elites and then failing to deliver. Mustapha, a graduate of the local Catholic College, 
stated:  
Promises were made fitfully, to these people that … after the TRC hearing 
provisions are going to be made especially to those who were amputated, those 
who were raped. I, I was actually convinced that indeed the TRC came actually 
to mend fences. 
Similarly Abdullah, a drugstore owner, who, when asked if people are waiting to this day 
for reparations, said: 
YES! They are expecting something, especially when the international 
community just focused to the perpetrators, encouraging them … But the victims 
now, who suffered the brunt of the war, have been neglected. 
Sally, a former staff member at the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDHR), 
the local NGO which assisted in the administration of the TRC hearings in Makeni, 
stated: 
I see them, some of them who talk, there was supposed to be a reparation 
packet, up to now they are waiting for it. Like the amputees at Panlap, this is a 
crime.  
In each of these quotes, we see the speaker, an educated English speaking local 
elite, describe the situation of the non-elites, the local-locals as Richmond has called 
them,24F25 as expecting something and as feeling aggrieved at having not received it. 
These speakers highlight that the expectations for the TRC among local non-elites were 
set by the processes of the DDR program, which provided the perpetrators of the 
violence with resources. As the TRC stated in its sensitization campaign that it was 
coming to help the victims and to bring peace, this was interpreted or re-imagined, in 
the local context, that this would be the same form of help that had already been given 
to the perpetrators; packets including money, skills training, and tools to start a new job. 
The international community had given packets to those who ‘had done the bad’, so 
because it failed to do the same for victims it was seen, as one young woman named 
Hanna claimed, as coming ‘to add pepper in my wound.’   
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Friction and International Intervention 
 
As was noted in the introduction, a great amount of recent literature has been wrestling 
with the divergence between theory, practice, and experience in the field of 
peacebuilding. As in the case of Sierra Leone, the theorized results of peacebuilding 
projects do not always emerge when interventions are applied in local settings. Instead, 
complexities abound at the sites where the international and the local interact. 
Intervention is rarely predictable. In response to similar dynamics in a different field, 
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing introduced the concept of ‘friction’ as a means to understand 
the dynamic processes of “global interconnection.”25F26 This concept allows us to study the 
movement of universalizing ideas from place to place in interaction with individual 
agents in particular local contexts who re-imagine and re-interpret them, and, in so 
doing, make them something new in their activation within that unique setting. In this 
way, Tsing argues that local “cultures are continually co-produced” through the 
“awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across 
difference.”26F27 
 A central analogy for Tsing is that of a tire on a road, wherein it is the interaction 
of the two that produces movement and change. Without the friction between the two 
there would be no progress. However, at the same time, as universalizing ideas travel 
this generative friction is a source of heat, of tension, of debate, and of conflict. A 
paradigm or idea in one place may produce freedom, liberty, or justice for individuals or 
groups, but once it is seen as a universal and is transported to another setting it may 
have unexpected consequences. Tsing argues that this is because “concepts are 
transformed in translation”27F28 and the imposition of a paradigm in a new setting can 
produce unpredictable results.  
One way that this happens, she argues, is through “travelling packages;” 
concepts or universalizing ideas that “travel when they are translated in such a way as 
to form a significant intervention in a local scene.”28F29 Such interventions are bundles of 
principles and ideals, wrapped up in practices and allegories, transmitting norms of 
behavior and thought from one place to another. However, in crossing borders and 
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interacting with new localities and differently socialized and acculturated individuals 
these packages are translated “to become interventions in new scenes where they 
gather local meanings and find their place as distinctive political interventions.”29F30 In this 
way, such interventions must be seen as unpredictable and potentially destabilizing, but 
also as productive, while activated and incorporated only through local agency and 
autonomy. Within the idea of friction local actors are recognized as creative actors 
interacting, re-imagining, or re-structuring the universalizing ideas and practices 
intervening in their local setting. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, Rosalind Shaw has already described the particular 
interactions between the TRC and local processes of memory and “arts of forgetting,”30F31 
describing these interactions as “frictional.”31F32 Shaw clearly explains how the TRC 
embodied the “hegemonic, historically constituted Western memory discourse” in an 
“internationally compelling … model that linked the painful verbalization of memory with 
personal empowerment and national redemption” which, with its apparent success in 
South Africa, created “a new paradigm of transitional justice”.32F33 This traveling package 
of an international norm, a “universalizing idea” in Tsing’s terminology, interacted with 
the locally salient and dominant processes of memory and created something new, the 
friction between the two was, as Shaw describes, “in some ways productive, creating 
new forms of remembering and forgetting.”33F34 While local people did not respond to the 
TRC in the manner expected or predicted by those who planned the TRC, they 
integrated “their testimony into prevailing understandings of healing and forgetting.”34F35 In 
this way, Shaw shows, the interaction between the international (the TRC) and the local 
(traditional processes of social recovery), exemplified the pattern identified by Tsing. 
 However, I want to build on this and argue that friction, conceived as occurring 
between this single intervention – this one traveling package – and local processes is 
only a part of the story. In the case of Sierra Leone, I would argue, the turbulent 
interaction between the TRC and local processes of memory and recovery was 
aggravated further by the parallel operation of scores of interventions, each embodying 
a particular conception or paradigm of postwar needs, a different ‘universalizing idea.’ 
As articulated by Shaw, the TRC did embody an internationally accepted paradigm of 
postwar needs regarding proper postwar memorial and reconciliation – so well 
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articulated in Nadler and Shnable’s “needs-based model of reconciliation,”35F36 and can be 
seen as a traveling package. But the SCSL, the DDR program, and the myriad NGO 
processes that intervened in the postwar setting of Sierra Leone must also be seen as 
traveling packages transporting competing universalizing ideas. In this complicated 
environment peacebuilding interventions overlapped and interconnected in the minds 
and imaginations of local populations, producing not a friction between one traveling 
package and a local setting, but a compound friction between that local setting and a 
number of parallel peacebuilding projects. 
 
Parallel Peacebuilding Processes and Compound Friction 
 
Just as the TRC can be seen as a traveling package embodying a universalizing 
paradigm of transitional justice, so the DDR program can be seen as embodying a 
security based conception of postwar needs, where peacebuilding requires the 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of troops.36F37 In this paradigm the 
purpose of DDR is to ensure future peace by disarming combatants in order to take 
away the means to violence and “ensuring security on the ground by providing effective 
policing.”37F38 In addition, the reintegration of ex-combatants is seen as necessary to avoid 
future returns to violence38F39 and as such, in the case of Sierra Leone, ex-combatants 
who registered for DDR were provided with $150, six months of skills training, and in 
some cases a set of tools required to begin working in that career field.39F40 The DDR 
program in Sierra Leone was, like the TRC, an embodiment of a particular international 
conception of peacebuilding best practice, being implemented in a local context and 
interacting in unexpected ways with the local community. It embodied, however, a very 
different universalizing idea than that embodied by the TRC. 
Similarly, the SCSL embodies an international paradigm and represents another 
traveling package. Unlike truth commissions, which are understood to embody 
restorative conceptions of justice and to create peace by promoting intergroup 
reconciliation, criminal tribunals such as the SCSL are embodiments of retributive 
justice. Such bodies are rooted in paradigms aimed at incapacitation and deterrence, or 
at separating the perpetrators from the general population and stopping repetitions of 
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similar atrocities in the future.40F41 This paradigm assumes that by holding individuals 
accountable for their crimes, by defeating an air of impunity, such tribunals will deter 
others from committing the same crimes in the future.41F42 As Diane Orentlicher argues: 
“[i]f the international community is to play an effective role in breaking cycles of 
impunity, it must do what it can to create a greater space for accountability.”42F43 This is 
what these tribunals attempt to do, ensure accountability. Such a concept of justice 
supports the notion that individual punishment will deter crimes and is based on a 
complex of ideas which build to the conclusion that justice is served if the individuals 
you define to be the most responsible for atrocities are punished, thus avoiding the 
repetition of those atrocities. And, in this tradition, as noted above, the SCSL was 
responsible only for punishing those persons “who bear the greatest responsibility”.43F44  
The SCSL also was an embodiment of a particular international conception of right 
practice, being implemented in a local context and interacting in unexpected ways with 
the local community. But again, this is a universalizing idea quite unlike that embodied 
by the TRC. 
And, of course, the work of NGOs too embodies a particular heuristic or 
paradigm of postwar needs. Throughout the world today a diverse array of NGOs 
provide food, healthcare, housing, education, livelihoods training, good governance 
programming, and many other services in transitional periods after violent conflict. As 
has been well articulated by scholars of international development, such institutions are 
embodiments of Western conceptions of development itself, transporting across the 
globe a particular conception of progress. Tsing identifies NGOs as involved in the 
internationalization of Indonesian environmentalism in her initial work on friction,44F45 while 
scholars such as Easterly45F46 and Duffield46F47 argue that NGOs are agents of a particular 
post-WWII paradigm of human progress. Of course, NGOs come in all shapes and 
sizes and attempt to tackle many different forms of social problems and concerns. But 
few question that NGOs are today central actors within what Lipschutz called the “global 
civil society”47F48 which communicate international ideas and conceptions of the “needs, 
interests, and values of people at large.”48F49 As such, NGOs too embody particular 
universalizing ideas. 
Published in International Peacekeeping, 2013, 20(2), pp 189-203. 
 As so we can see that, just as the TRC was a traveling package transporting a 
particular paradigm of transitional justice to a unique local setting in Sierra Leone – as 
identified correctly by Shaw – so the SCSL, the DDR program, and the various NGOs 
too were embodiments of particular paradigms, international universalizing ideas. But 
the idea of friction allows us only to study and imagine the interaction between individual 
traveling packages and local actors; isolating the particular awkward engagements 
between one international intervention and local agents from other ongoing influences. 
Within the field of peacebuilding, as shown above, the situation is far more dynamic and 
requires a way to conceptualize the interaction between local agents and multiple 
ongoing interventions. This can be achieved if we see the potential for interventions not 
only to interact with local settings and local agents in an isolated fashion, but to interact, 
within the imaginations of local agents, with each other; if we recognize the operation fo 
compound frictions. This is an important switch because the TRC, SCSL, DDR and 
NGOs are in many ways embodiments of competing paradigms and universalizing 
ideas, and yet they were clearly co-culpable in the generation of local experiences of 
each other.  
 The idea of compound friction, therefore, allows us to see how the goals and 
processes of parallel peacebuilding processes are intertwined with each other within the 
minds and imaginations of local individuals who, for their part, take this information and 
create of it what they will within their own context. This expansion of Tsing’s friction 
serves as a window into this complicated dynamic in Sierra Leone, but such 
complicated interrelations between peacebuilding processes is not unique to the case of 
Sierra Leone. Indeed, all postwar environments today play host to similar numbers of 
parallel peacebuilding projects and require, therefore, that scholars and practitioners 
have some way to understand such complex dynamics. Compound friction provides that 
analytic tool. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the greatest challenges for peacebuilding scholars and practitioners today is to 
understand the interaction between the international and the local. This is paramount if 
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peacebuilding interventions are to have any meaning to local people and if international 
interventions are to build peace. The data presented in this paper shows that any such 
understanding must take into account not only the frictions between peacebuilding 
interventions and agents in the local setting, but the interaction of many parallel 
peacebuilding processes administered in postwar settings within the minds and 
imaginations of those agents in a process of compound friction. If we do not understand 
how peacebuilding interventions are understood and experienced by local people when 
they are administered side by side, we have no chance of understanding experience of 
modern complex peacebuilding as a whole. 
 Based on this need I make a number of general recommendations for future 
peacebuilding practice and scholarship. First, practitioners must recognize the limits of 
sensitization campaigns regarding the mandates, goals, processes and benefits for 
local people of interventions within settings characterized by the administration of many 
parallel peacebuilding processes. Much more effort must go into any sensitization in 
such settings and, if sufficient funding and time cannot be provided for sensitization, 
then the viability of any such interventions should be called into question. Second, no 
practitioners should assume that the goals and processes of their intervention are 
understood within such complex peacebuilding contexts simply because they have 
conducted a sensitization campaign. Much more time and effort must be spent 
evaluating local understandings of peacebuilding interventions before, during, and after 
such interventions. This may be the only way to avoid the kinds of misunderstandings 
and negative experiences described in the data presented above.  
Third, more peacebuilding scholars must conduct qualitative studies of local 
understandings of peacebuilding processes – specifically among local non-elites – prior 
to, during, and after they are administered. Future research must explore further the 
compound frictions within complex peacebuilding contexts and study more fully both 
how parallel peacebuilding processes are conflated in local settings and how, or even if, 
this can be avoided. Comparative case studies across countries will be important in any 
future research agenda. And finally, scholars of transitional justice, security sector 
reform, reconciliation, democratization, memory, economic restructuring, psychological 
trauma, and the many other fields involved today in peacebuilding interventions, must 
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cooperate more regularly to understand how their proposed processes affect locals on 
the ground. Future research into compound frictions in peacebuilding contexts requires 
cooperation across the disciplines studying the interventions that embody the many 
‘universalizing ideas’ of peacebuilding.  
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